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ABSTRACT
The paper considers a securities market where orders are channelled
through professional broker-dealers such as London's market makers or the
large banks operating on continental exchanges. If these duel-capacity
dealers can judge the motives behind their customers' orders, they can trade
profitably on own account (even if they cannot "front run", that is, trade
on own account before executing a customer order). It is shown that the
dealers have an incentive to satisfy roughly half their customers' orders
from their own inventory if they are sure that orders are liquidity-
motivated and not based on inside information. As a result of dual-capacity
dealing, transaction costs for liquidity-motivated traders in the aggregate
fall, though they rise for those traders who are unable to convince any
dealer that they have no inside information. The liquidity of the main
market worsens, though its effective liquidity for customers whose orders
are partly filled from broker-dealer inventories improves.
August, 1989
~ The author thanks Marco Pagano, Pete Kyle and the participants in the 6th
European Meeting on the Economics of Information for many helpful
discussions.1. Introduction
This paper considers the role of dual-capacity traders in an auction
market for securities. Dual-capacity traders act both as brokers who bring
clients' orders to the market and as dealers who trade on their own account.
Examples that come to mind are London's market makers after the Big Bang,
Chicago's floor traders and the major banks in continental Europe.
The paper will not focus on the obvious conflict of interest inherent
in determining a price when a dealer can execute clients' orders against his
own (or an associate's) book. Most exchanges have rules safeguarding against
abuses, though the recent scandals in Chicago suggest that they are far from
watertight. Instead, it will be taken for granted that dealers keep to rules
designed to ensure fair pricing. In London, for example, market makers may
satisfy brokerage orders in-house provided that "best execution" is
obtained: the price must be the best one quoted in the market. Similarly, in
Italy banks who fill customer orders from their own inventory must do so at
the market price reigning in the first following stock exchange batch
suction in Milan.
Even so, in Italy it is commonly argued that banks are able to
manipulate prices and take advantage of ordinary traders, and that this may
be a principal cause of the poor liquidity of the main market. Along similar
lines, in London it has been argued that British market makers with a strong
customer base have an unfair advantage over their (American) rivals, and
that the current Stock Exchange rule changes (which reduce the visibility of
true available prices and recent trading historyl, turning back the clock
on some of the changes introduced at the time of the Big Bang) exacerbate
this problem.
In this paper I will attempt to model dual-capacity trading in a
market where dealers are risk neutral and competitive, and orders are placed
by both uninformed agents trading for liquidity purposes and traders with
some measure of inside information. Dual-capacity traders' competitive
1 Market makers are now allowed to execute small orders in-house at the best
quoted market price even if they themselves are not quoting that price
onscreen. Also, the publication of large trades onscreen is to be delayed.2
advantage rests in their ability to identify at least some of their
brokerage customers as liquidity traders and use this information in taking
profitable positionsz.
2. A model where dealers know their brokerage customers
The setting to be investigated in this paper is one where broker-
dealers are able to identify the customer who places an order with them and
judge his motives for wishing to trade. This might stem from a longstanding
relationship with the customer or a detailed knowledge of his current
financial needs, so that the dealer can infer with some degree of certainty
that his customer's wish to buy or sell does not stem from inside
information.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the dealer either knows for sure
that a particular customer is an uninformed liquidity trader, or knows
nothing at all about him (in practice, of course, intermediate degrees of
knowledge are likely to prevail). Moreover, for now any given uninformed
customer has at most one, if any, broker-dealer available who knows that he
is uninformed.
Suppose that aggregate liquidity traders' demand u is a mean-zero
normally distributed variable with variance Qu2. There are N broker-dealers,
each of whom has a customer base which allows him to identify a portion of
uninformed traders' demand ui that has variance oiz, for i-1, .. , N. For
ease of computation it will be assumed that all dealers have an equally
large customer base, so that
oi2-o2
for all i. Individual traders' demands
are independent, so that:
2 2 2 2
~~ i 61 t... t 6N ' 6U
2 The paper does not consider a second potential source of profit for
broker-dealers: "front running", that is, trading on own account after
receiving customer orders but before executing those orders.3
where the index is i-0 refers to that portion of liquidity trading demand
which none oF the broker-dealers can certify as such (602 - 0 is not ruled
out). Such demand might be chanelled through single capacity (agency-only)
brokers; or it might be placed via broker-dealers who are ignorant of the
identity and motives of the agents placing the orders.
The broker-dealers submit net demand schedules on their own account of
Zi(ui.P). i-1. .. , N.
For simplicity let there be just one informed trader whose
informational advantage over all other market participants enables him to
form a best estimate of the security's true value, differing from the
current public-information best estimate p~ by a mean-zero, normally
distributed amount (v-v~) with variance V. He is presumed to submit a net
demand schedule x- X(v,p) to the market.
It is assumed that there is a large enough number of competing market
makers or "uninformed speculators" who submit price-quantity schedules to
ensure that in equilibrium, the market price is equal to the expected value
of the security, given aggregate net demand and public information. Total
market demand (y) submitted to this group of competitive single-capacity
market makers comes from the three main groups of agents identified above:
the insider(s), the noise traders and the noise traders' broker-dealers:
N N
Y- F u. '~ Z.(u..P) ' X(v.P). i i i i-0 i-1
Perfect competition then ensures that the market is efficient:
P - ELv~Y~.
Pro~osition 1: The unique linear equilibrium of' the model described above is
given by:
P(Y) - v~ ' aY
X(v.P) - ~(v-P)
Zi(ui.P) --b ui - y(P-v~) i-1. .. . N4
where b is the unique real root (for o z~ 0) of: 0
(1-b)3 (2N-1) 02 - (1-b)2 (N-1) 02 . 2(1-b) 6~2 - 6~2 - O.
Note that }5bs1 and b~} as N~, holding No2 fixed3. Given b, the other
parameters follow from:
1-2b
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Proof: We look for a Nash equilibrium in trading strategies. A justification
for the method used is given in Section 5 of Kyle (1989).
I. The insider chooses a net demand schedule X(v,p) that maximises his
expected profits, given that he knows v, the value of the security, and
infers (from the market price) the noise traders' demand net of the
resulting supply from broker-dealers:
max (v-p) x
{x}
where p - ~G ' ~(W-Ny(p-~G)'x)
3 In a simpler model in which dual-capacity traders are presumed to submit
Z4 2
price-inelastic net demands (i.e., y-0), we obtain b-}, p- 00 }Ne , and
a-1. Because dual-capacity traders are professional speculators who play a
ce~tral role in the market, it seems more reasonable to model them adjusting
their demand to market conditions, i.e., setting price-quantity schedules.N
w~~- b F r]i.
i-1
5
Substituting in for p and taking the first order condition:
x - 12~ (v-v0) - ~iW
x - 1~~ (v-P)
R ' (1)
II. Broker-dealer i maximises expected profits, given ui and the market
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Inserting (4) into (1), we have
o~2~N(1-b)2v2-pVNy
~ - aV . N~
~2V - 6~2tN(1-S)262
using ( 1) and (3) in (2):
y - (2p-~)(1-2b).
Hence ~ - p 1-2b 1-b







Using (6) and (5) to eliminate ~- and p in this equation, the cubic
expression for b is obtained.
It is readily verified that the cubic equation's real roots must lie in the
interval [},1]. Inside that interval, the slope with respect to (1-b):
3(1-b)2(2N-1)62-2(1-b)íN-1)o2,2602
must be positive whenever the cubic expression equals zero, since in that
event (1-b)3(2N-1)o2-(1-b)2(N-1)~2)0 (given that 2(1-b)d~2-oU2~0). Hence,
there is only one real root when o~~0. 18
At this point it seems appropriate to make some comments justifying
our assumptions concerning the nature of the information exploited by the
dual-capacity dealers.
Why need we assume that dealers know something about the identity of
the traders who place the order flow? In our static model, where front
running by dealers is excluded, the order flow to each dealer will not in
itself convey any useful information over and above the aggregate order
flow. If dealers 1...N were to receive independent anonymous components of
the uninformed order flow with standard deviations s1...sN respectively,
then an insider would optimally divide up his total market order among the
dealers in proportion to these standard deviations. Individual dealers'
order flow would then convey no information on the insider's total trade
that is not expressed in the aggregate order flow, and hence in the
competitive market price. Thus dual-capacity dealers would not be able to
trade profitably.
Why not have the dual-capacity dealers identify insider orders rather
than liquidity trading orders, end thus deduce some exclusive information
about security value from their order flow?4 If able to identify an
insider order, the dealer would have an incentive to take a similar trading
stance. This competition would spoil the market for the insider. Hence
insiders have every incentive to hide behind anonymous intermediaries and~or
to place orders directly via single capacity (agency only) brokers. In
contrast, identifiable liquidity traders benefit from their dealer's trading
from own inventory.
4 In Cripps' (1989) model, the order flow to a particular dealer corrveys
information about the security's value that is not contained in the aggregate
market quantity. However, in that model the dealer uses the insider's naive
one-shot trade to devise an optimal trading strategy that trickles the
information slowly into the market over time and maximises the expected profit
obtained from the information. Thus the dealer would be able to more than
compensate the insider for any losses incurred if he competes with the
insider's trade in the first period.9
3. Comparison of market equilibrium with and without dual capacitv
dealing
Let us compare the results obtained in Proposition 1 with the
situation in which dual-capacity trading is banned. In that case, our model
coincides with a limiting case discussed in Section 8 of Kyle (1989).





Thus in the absence of dual-capacity trading, the insider trades somewhat
more vigorously (~ is greater) in response to his information.
The presence of dual-capacity trading does harm the liquidity of the
main market. Intuitively, dual-capacity traders offset a proportion b-} of
their liquidity customers' demand by supplying from their own inventory.
This means that total liquidity trading on the main market is sparser. Then
any order placed directly on the main market will have a greater impact on
prices.
To see this, the price impact of an order from an anonymous liquidity
trader (who does not have a relationship of trust with any broker-dealer)
can be calculated. Solving the equilibrium conditions for the price in terms
of exogenous variables, and using equation (1):
N
P-v~ - ~(u~ ' ~ (1-b)ui r ~(v-P)-Ny(P-vd))
i-110
N
p-~p - 1.~n~,N~ (u0 } F (1-b)ui ' P(~-vp))
i-1
1 N
- 2 (u~ t ~ (1-S)ui) . ~(~-v~)
S i-1
dp a 1
i.e. duo - lt~ ~'N7l - 2~





Since g` Z S. du Z du ' Thus an order from a customer who cannot convince a
0
dealer that he is uninformed moves the market price more than it would in
the absence of dual-capacity trading. However, liquidity traders who are
able to convince a broker-dealer that they have no information are better
off. Their orders do not exert as much price pressure because the broker-
dealer will satisfy roughly one halF of their order from his own inventory:







Thus these agents trade on better terms than they would in the absence of
dual-capacity trading.
Are aggregate transaction costs for all liquídity traders reduced by
the presence of dusl-capacity trading? To see that this is indeed the case,
the ex ante (before observing v or ui) expected profits of the insider and
the dual-capacity traders taken together need to be calculated. These are
equal to the average transaction costs borne by the liquidity traders as a
group.
Insider profit - (v-p)x
- p(~-P)2
N
- p[i(~-v~) - Zp (u~ t F (1-b)ui)]
i-1
using equation (~).
Ex ante expected insider profit
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N
~ Z~(u~ t ~ (1-b)ui))]
i-1
N
- ~i~(v-v ) - 1 (u t ~ (1-b)u.)] ~-~N (v-v ) - ~ u 0 g 0 i-1 i ~ 0 2p 0
N
- (b i (1-b) ~ ~ u.] 2p i-1 i
Ex ante expected broker-dealers' profit
' ~ ( -V .




2 ) t 2~ (1-S)S Na
Adding up, total expected profits of insider and broker-dealers
- z~ (aQ2 ~ (1-b)Na2).
'fhis expression measures the total transaction cost to liquidity traders. to
see that it is smaller than it would be in the absence of dual capacity,
observe that:
Transaction cost with dual capacity
Transaction cost without dual capacity
1 ~ 2
- 2~ (ca t (t-b)ha )
~ (a~2 } Na2)13
(a~2t (1-b)Na2)Z
(aU2{N(1-S)Za2)(aU2tNa2)
~ 1 if b ~ 0.
Thus the profits of the dual-capacity traders are more than offset by the
reduction in insider profits. The overall quality of the market improves
because more is known about the liquidity traders, reducing the order flow
"noise" behind which the insider hides his trades.
Observe, however, that the reduction in insider profits means that
there is less of an incentive to gather information. This may reduce the
informational efficiency of the market. Our model is not complete enough to
address the question of whether the current situation provides over- or
underinvestment in information gathering. Indeed, it also fails to consider
the distortionary effect of high transaction costs: liquidity traders'
demand is taken to be exogenous and price-inelastic.
Note that throughout this discussion it has been assumed that either
noise traders do not behave strategically or, equivalently, broker-dealers
can observe the total net demand of any noise trader identified as such. For
if not, even a noise trader with an inelastic net demand for the security
can place an order for a large multiple of his true demand with his broker-
dealer, and reverse the excessive demand with a direct order on the open
market. This strategy yields a better execution price, at the expense of the
broker-dealer who supplied half the order from his own account. Under these
circumstances broker-dealers would not wish to trade on own account, and the
equilibrium would be that of the standard model where all orders are placed
anonymously.
4. The role of competition among dual-capacity dealers
In the model analysed so far, it has been assumed that each liquidity
trader can find only one, if any, broker-dealer whom he can convince that he
is uninformed. Can the dealer exploit his monopoly power with regard to this
information, by raising his commission fee to negate all or part of hisi4
client's gain from the improved execution price resulting from the dealer's
offsetting trade from own inventory? Probably not. All the client has to do
is make known to this particular dealer how much he intends to trade. If the
dealer attempts to extract a noncompetitive commission fee from him, the
client is free to take his order to any other broker or broker-dealer. As
long as the spurned dealer knows the potential client's planned order, he
will still have an incentive to exploit this information by offsetting
roughly half the order through his own proprietary trading, just as if the
order were placed through him. In any case, commission fees are fixed in
several of the European continental exchanges, so that there broker-dealers
cannot exploit informational power by raising commission fees anyway.
What happens when more than one broker-dealer knows that a particular
segment of the order flow is pure liquidity trading? We consider one such
setting in which there are N segments of such liquidity demand, about each
of which K different dual-capacity traders are ínformed. For simplicity it
is assumed that each dual-capacity trader has only one piece of such
information5, so that there are in total NK dual-capacity traders with
some information.
Proposition 2: The unique linear equilibrium of the model described above is
given by:
PÍY) - ~~ t AY
X(~.P) - P(v-P)
Zi(ui.P) - -bui-~(P-v~) i-1, . , KN
where b is the unique real root of:
(ÍK}1)N-1)(1-Kb)362-(N-1)(1-Kb)2a2 t (Ktl)(1-KS)a~2-a~Z - 0
5 In a model with price inelastic dual-capacity trader demands this
assumption would have no effect on the outcome.15
Note that itK s b 5 1 and b.~ 1tK for large N 6.





~ - 1 1-Kb
S 1-Kb-KN 1- Ktl b
Proof: Not shown. Exactly analogous to the method used in proving
Proposition 1. ,
Observe that as K increases (1-Kb) - K41 decreases. As the number of
competing dealers who know that a particular trade is liquidity-motivated
increases, the proportion not supplied directly from dealers' inventory
decreases. Liquidity traders have an incentive to convince as many dealers
as possible that the order that they plan to place is not motivated by
inside information. "Sunshine trading", in which agents publicly announce in
advance their intention to make a large deal, is an example. In practice
6 It can be shown that with price-inelastic dual-capacity trader demands,
b-1.K as in the linear Cournot-Nash model. 1'hcn tfny uninCormed trader
identified as such by K dealers will see a proportíon KK1 of his order
satisfied from dealers' inventories, with only a proportion K~1 going to the
main market. Hence,
~ 'i6
such announcements often fail to achieve the desired effect for two reasons.
Firstly, market professionals may not believe that the proposed deal is not
information-generated. Secondly, such an announcement may not be credible
for reasons discussed at the end of Section 3: traders have an incentive to
announce a very large intended trade, and then place a smaller actual order.
Dealers who trade based on the announcement then make losses.
In the limit, as K~, a situation is achieved where only the anonymous
component of order flows determines market liquidity:
(1-bK) ~ 0.
Here main market liquidity is minimal, but certified liquidity traders exert
no pressure on prices and thus trade at near-zero transaction cost. Broker-
dealers are too competitive to make profits, and insider profits are
minimal. Thus aggregate transaction costs to liquidity traders as a group
are minimized; however, they are borne entirely by those liquidity traders
who are unable to convince the market professionals that they are
uninformed.
In theory, much the same effect may be achieved indirectly if dual-
capacity firms are forced to announce their price-quantity schedules
publicly during the auction market tatonnement. The outcomes described in
Propositions 1 and 2 would then no longer be an equilibrium because the
schedules Zi(ui,p) reveal {u1,...,uN} publicly to all other market
participants, who adjust their behaviour accordingly. Instead, the limiting
outcome described above would be an equilibrium.With dual-capacity firms forced to reveal their price-quantity
schedules for proprietary trading, the equilibrium that fully reveals (ul t
... . uN) could emerge:
N
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This equilibrium minimises total transaction costs for liquidity traders~.
London's market makers are an example of a group of dual-capacity
dealers who are to some degree forced to publicize their trading strategy in
the form of bid and ask quotes. However, these quotes are not fully
~ In this equilibrium the agents who have private information (the dual-
capacity dealers) have no incentive to trade and thus express their
information (the ui) in the final equilibrium; see Hellwig (1980) for a
discussion of this problem in the context of a competitive rational
expectations equilibrium. Presumably the information is conveyed during the
preceding tatonnemenC process, in which dealers have no incentive to hold back
information (given that in the final equilibrium they will be held to zero
trading on own account anyway) but also no incentive to reveal it.18
informative because they are only firm for small trades. Moreover, now dual-
capacity firms are allowed to satisfy small orders from own inventory at
will at the best price quoted in the market even if they themselves are not
quot,ing thnt price. Hence there is now even more scope for adopting a
proprietary trading policy that is not visible to other market participants
via the bid-ask quotes. This should thus lead to higher transaction costs
for liquidity traders in the aggregate even if the firm's own customers
benefit.
5. Policy implications
In our model dual-capacity trading reduces total transaction costs for
liquidity traders. True, the liquidity for anonymous orders on the main
market deteriorates. But this effect is more than offset by benefits to
customers of dual-capacity firms which partly fill orders from own
inventory, resulting in less price pressure and improved execution quality.
A Chicago Mercantile Exchange Panel defended dual capacity trading (Wall
Street Journal, April 20, 1989) on these grounds: "Dual trading is needed
... to maintain enough liquidity".
'['here are two potential disadvantages associated with dual-capacity
trading. Firstly, it may be considered unfair that some traders' transaction
costs actually rise though the total Falls. Equsl treatment of all potential
investors is a principle on which many current rules are based8. Secondly,
insiders' profits are reduced. This might be undesirable if the market
currently provides insufficient incentives for gathering information.
8 For example, the London and NASDAQ rule requiring market makers to quote
"firm" prices for deals up to a certain size means that it is hard to take
advantage of inexperienced traders. But it also means that market makers are
less able to protect themselves against known insiders and must therefore
charge higher average spreads.19
In Section 4 it was shown that these effects are particularly strong
if liquidity traders can convince multiple competing broker-dealers that
they have a trade that is not information-driven in mind, or if broker-
dealers are forced to make public their price-quantity schedules.
One final word of caution. Our model does not explore the full range
of effects associated with dual capacity trading. In particular, our static
approach precludes an analysis of "front running" whereby dual traders trade
on own account in advance of customer order execution. We also do not
address one of the prime practical reasons why broker-dealers in continental
Europe have diverted order flow away from the main exchange: fixed brokerage
commissions. When these exceed order processing costs, there is a strong
incentive to cross orders in-house or fill them from own inventory. This
particular motive for in-house execution should disappear once commission
rates are left to be determined by competitive market forces.20
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